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ABSTRACT
In recent years, printable graphical codes have attracted a lot
of attention enabling a link between the physical and digital
worlds, which is of great interest for the IoT and brand pro-
tection applications. The security of printable codes in terms
of their reproducibility by unauthorized parties or clonabil-
ity is largely unexplored. In this paper, we try to investigate
the clonability of printable graphical codes from a machine
learning perspective. The proposed framework is based on a
simple system composed of fully connected neural network
layers. The results obtained on real codes printed by several
printers demonstrate a possibility to accurately estimate digi-
tal codes from their printed counterparts in certain cases. This
provides a new insight on scenarios, where printable graphi-
cal codes can be accurately cloned.
Index Terms— Printable graphical codes, clonability at-
tack, machine learning.
1. INTRODUCTION
Counterfeiting of physical objects is a very important problem
for the modern economies. There exist several techniques to
protect original products against falsification and to provide
a link between a physical object and its digital representation
in centralized or distributed databases. This link can be im-
plemented via overt channels, like personalized codes repro-
duced on products either directly or in a form of coded sym-
bologies like 1D and 2D codes or covert channels, like invisi-
ble digital watermarks embedded in images or text or printed
by special invisible inks. However, it is crucial to provide a
non-clonability of this link to avoid any false acceptance of
fake objects as authentic ones. Two most well known tech-
nologies that claim to ensure such a non-clonability are Phys-
ical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) [1] and Printable Graphic
Codes (PGC) that originate from the work [2]. The theoreti-
cal comparison of PUFs and PGC is given in [3]. In this paper
we focus on the clonability of PGC. The deployment of PGC
has a lot of advantages and attracts many industrial players
and governmental organizations. Nevertheless, the claimed
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Fig. 1: Training procedure based on training samples (xi,ypi ).
non-clonability of PGC remains largely unexplored besides
some rare exceptions [4, 5].
The main goal of this paper is to investigate the resistance
of PGC to clonability attacks. The overwhelming majority
of such attacks can be split into two main groups: (a) hand-
crafted attacks, which are based on the experience and know-
how of the attackers and (b) machine learning based attacks,
which use training data to create clones of the original codes.
In this paper, we focus on the investigation of machine
learning based attacks due to the recent advent in the theory
and practice of machine learning tools. Growing popularity
and remarkable results of deep neural network (DNN) archi-
tectures in computer vision applications motivated us to inves-
tigate the clonability of PGC using these architectures trained
for different classes of printers. In our study, we assume that
the detection mechanism of defender is also unknown, thus
making our attack universal in this sense.
Therefore, the main contributions of this paper are:
- we investigate the clonability of printable graphical
codes using machine learning based attacks;
- we examine the proposed framework on real printed
codes reproduced with 4 printers;
- we empirically demonstrate a possibility to sufficiently
accurately clone the PGC from their printed counterparts in
certain cases.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion 2 introduces a problem formulation and gives the details
about the used test patterns, DNN architecture, training and
test processes. Section 3 provides the details about the used
printers, scanner and used dataset. The obtained empirical
results and their analysis complete Section 3. Section 4 con-
cludes the paper.
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Table 1: Examples of attacks against PGC: two samples of scanned codes, the estimates produced by BN model and the
difference between the original and estimated codes.
2. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In our set up, we assume that the training dataset of the pairs
of original (digital) X = {x1, ...,xM} ∈ {0, 1}N×M and
printed codes Yp = {yp1, ...,ypM} ∈ RN×M reproduced
with popular high resolution printing technologies denoted as
p = {1, ..., P} is given. We assume ypi ∈ RN due to the
scanning of printed codes in general, or ypi ∈ {0, ..., 255}N
in particular. The goal of the attacker is to obtain an accurate
estimation of the original digital codes Xˆp = {xˆp1, ..., xˆpM} ∈
{0, 1}N×M for each printing technology p. Mathematically,
it can be formulated as an estimate:
xˆpi = fϑp(y
p
i ), (1)
where i = 1, ...,M and, in general case, fϑp(.) can be any
trainable function with the parameters ϑp.
2.1. Deep neural network models
Nowadays, DNN technologies offer ample opportunities for
training fϑp(.) in a form of parametrized deep architectures.
We investigate the possibilities of two types of the DNN ar-
chitectures for solving problem (1). The first one is based on
several fully connected layers of the same size as the input
data. Inspired by the fundamental role of autoencoders [6, 7]
in unsupervised learning, we investigate a system based on a
”bottleneck” structure, where the dimensionality of the layers
is reduced to the middle layer and then expanded to the full
dimensionality in the output layer.
For both architectures the general schema of the training
procedure is shown in Fig. 1. For the given pairs of original
and printed codes (X,Yp), it can be formulated as:
θˆp = arg min
θp
M∑
i=1
L(xi, φθp(ypi ))+ λΩθp(θp), (2)
where L(.) is a loss function, φθp is a trained model, θp rep-
resents the parameters of the trained model for chosen printer
p and Ωθp(.) is a regularizer for the model parameters. In
the case of an ”bottleneck” model φθp = φθpD (φθpE (.)), θ
p =
(θpE ,θ
p
D) with θ
p
E and θ
p
D denoting the parameters of encoder
and decoder parts, respectively.
In the vast majority of cases the original digital codes are
binary. However, training the DNN model with binary output
is not a trivial task due to the difficulties with derivatives and
vanishing of the gradients. For this reason in our framework
the output of the trained models is real. The binarization of
the regenerated codes is performed via a simple thresholding
with an optimal threshold estimated on the validation subset.
Therefore, the function fϑp in the equation (1) is:
fϑp(.) = Ttp(φθp(.)), (3)
where T (.) is a thresholding function with the threshold pa-
rameter tp and ϑp = (θp, tp).
At the test phase, the scanned sample ypi is passed through
the pre-trained DNN model. The estimation of the original
code xˆpi is obtained after thresholding T of the DNN output.
The estimated code is printed and scanned on the correspond-
ing equipment and the final decision about the code authentic-
ity is made based on a chosen similarity measure d(.) between
the original and printed estimated codes.
2.2. Test pattern
We used the DataMatrix symbology consisting of 72x72
modules, which is described in the international standard
ISO/IEC 16022 [8]. To obtain a random bit distribution, the
finder patterns were removed and only the mapping matrix of
64x64 modules was used for the printing tests.
It should be pointed out that although the DataMatrix
code was initially proposed as an overt feature for personali-
sation applications, the chosen parameters of this code closely
resemble those of the recently proposed PGC that might be
equivalently printed up to a resolution of 2400 dpi. In our
study we do not target to investigate the clonability of some
particular PGC, but rather to demonstrate a general approach
applicable to the majority of PGC designed with identical
modulation principles.
3. EXPERIMENTS AND DISCUSSION
Digital printers. To evaluate the clonability aspects of PGC
based on DataMatrix modulation and to investigate the in-
fluence of the printing technologies we use 4 digital print-
ers: 2 inkjet printers HP OfficeJet Pro 8210 (HP) and Canon
PIXMA iP7200 (CA) and 2 laser printers Lexmark CS310
(LX) and Samsung Xpress 430 (SA).
It should also be pointed out that up to our best knowledge
there does not exist any accurate mathematical model describ-
ing the process of interaction between the ink and substrate
(paper) besides some experimental studies as for example in
[9, 5]. Due to the fact that in all our experiments we use the
same paper, we skip this parameter in our models for simplic-
ity, but the impact of the substrate can be investigated in a
similar manner to the proposed one. Therefore, without loss
of generality we assume that the model of printing process is
unknown and is not required for our attack strategy.
DNN architectures. In our experiments we use two types
of DNN architectures with the same input size equals to 576:
1. FC: fully connected DNN with 2, 3 and 4 hidden layers
(hereafter referred to as FC 2, FC 3 and FC 4). The size of
each layer equals to the input size.
2. BN: ”bottleneck” model with 2 fully connected hidden
layers of size 256 and 128 at the encoder and decoder parts
and a latent representation of size 36.
In both cases we used `2 norm as a loss function L(.) in
(2). The DNNs were implemented in Pytorch1. The training
of the models was done on the Titan X GPU card with the
”Maxwell” architecture . All models were trained during 1
000 epochs with batch size equals to 128 and the learning
rate equals 1e−3.
PGC dataset. The dataset of 384 original binary codes X
of size 384× 384 was generated according to the DataMatrix
standard described in Section 2.2. To obtain the dataset of
the printed/scanned codes Yp p = {1, ..., P}, the original
codes were printed on 4 printers (P = 4) and scanned with
the Epson Perfection V850 Pro scanner at 1200 ppi. The pairs
(X,Yp) were split into training (100 images), validation (50
images) and test (234 images) subsets. Taking into account
that the input size of the used DNN models equals 576, each
image was split into non-overlapping blocks of size 24 × 24.
Thus, the final size of the training set is 25 600 sub-images,
the validation set contains 12 800 sub-images and the test set
1https://github.com/taranO/clonability-of-printable-graphical-codes
Method SA LX HP CA
Pearson correlation
Thr 0.774 0.766 0.742 0.704
FC 2 0.995 0.994 0.982 0.981
FC 3 0.994 0.994 0.982 0.983
FC 4 0.994 0.995 0.981 0.982
BN 0.996 0.996 0.986 0.984
normalized Hamming distance
Thr 11 12 13 15
FC 2 0.22 0.24 0.93 0.98
FC 3 0.23 0.24 0.90 0.85
FC 4 0.24 0.23 0.95 0.90
BN 0.21 0.22 0.69 0.76
Table 2: Regeneration accuracy with respect to original codes
consists of 59 904 sub-images.
It should be pointed out that the training procedure is blind
in the sense that we did not use any information about the
principles of the DataMatrix code generation.
To evaluate the accuracy of the prediction of ”regen-
erated” codes we use Pearson correlation and normalized
Hamming distance between the original digital codes and
the corresponding regenerated ones. The obtained results are
presented in Table 2. Additionally to the DNN models, we
perform the estimation from the printed codes via a simple
thresholding (without DNN processing) similarly to [4, 5, 2].
The obtained results correspond to the Thr method in Table
2 and serve as baseline error. From the presented results, it
is clear that the BN architecture provides the best results. To
provide more understanding how the codes look, we visu-
alize the sub-blocks of size 84 × 84 from several codes for
each printer and the estimations deploying the BN as the best
estimator in Table 1.
To answer the question if the amount of errors in the BN
regenerated codes can be noticed by the defender and how the
BN results differ from the baseline estimation obtained via
Thr method, we printed our estimated codes for both cases
on the same printers with the same parameters as the original
codes and after that we scanned them on the same scanner. To
evaluate the authenticity of the obtained results a number of
metrics can be used. However, according to the authors in [5]
the most used one is a comparison of an original with a bina-
rized or grey level version of the printed code. The authors
in [5] claim that the comparison with the grey level observa-
tions is preferable, since binarization is a lossy transforma-
tion. In our evaluation we use Pearson correlation between
the originals and grey level printed codes. Additionally, we
use normalized Hamming distance to measure the accuracy
of the logical symbol estimation in the originals and bina-
rized printed codes. Using these statistics, we compute the
ROC curves based on the probability of correct detection Pd
(a) Pearson correlation (b) Pearson correlation in log scale (c) Hamming distance (d) Hamming distance in log scale
Fig. 2: The ROC curves for Pearson correlation and Hamming distance between the original and fake printed codes estimated
via BN and Thr methods. Pd denotes to the probability of the correct detection and Pfa is the probability of false acceptance.
and the probability of false acceptance Pfa via:
Pd = Pr{α · d(xi,ypi ) ≥ γ|H0}
Pfa = Pr{α · d(xi,ypi ) > γ|H1},
(4)
where γ is the threshold, d(.) is a similarity measure between
the original and printed codes,H0 corresponds to the hypoth-
esis that ypi is an authentic code andH1 is the hypothesis that
ypi is a fake (cloned) code, α equals to 1 for the Pearson cor-
relation and to -1 for Hamming distance.
The obtained ROC curves are illustrated in Fig. 2. It is
easy to see that comparing with the baseline estimation via
Thr method, the system with BN models makes the fake de-
tection more difficult for defender. Particularly, as it can be
noticed from Fig. 2, in contrast to Thr based estimation in
the case of SA and HP printers, it is absolutely impossible to
reliably distinguish the originals and fakes. For the SA printer
this result is evident due to the previously demonstrated high
quality estimation. In the case of HP printer such a result
can be explained by the fact that, besides a quite big amount
of errors in the estimated codes, the printing quality is rel-
atively poor due to the high dot-gain. This leads to a suffi-
cient amount of errors in the original printed codes that are
masked in the printed fake codes due to the dot-gain effect.
As a result, both codes become very close. In the case of
the CA printer, the ROC behaviour is superior, which is ex-
pected due to the previously demonstrated low quality esti-
mation. The situation with the LX printer is the most inter-
esting. From one point, the printing quality of this printer is
a little bit worse than for the SA printer and the obtained es-
timated error is not much higher. However, detailed analysis
shows that the distributions of the errors between the codes is
different. In the case of the SA printer there are about 50% of
estimated codes without any mistake. This makes these fakes
undistinguishable for the detector and the general quality of
fake detection low. In the case of the LX printer, the errors
are distributed more or less uniformly between the codes, in
the sense that almost each code has estimation errors. Due
to the high printing quality this makes these codes ”better”
distinguishable for the detector. Nevertheless, it should be
pointed out that the general level of false acceptance for the
LX printer is too high for practical use. For example, as can
be seen from Fig. 2 for the probability of correct detection of
around 0.95 the probability of false acceptance is 0.6. To have
the Pfa close to 0, one can achieve the Pd of only about 0.6 -
0.8. For practical applications Pd should not be less than 0.99
with the Pfa not exceeding 10−6. From this we can conclude
that the obtained results demonstrate the low resistance of the
PGC based on DataMatrix modulation and similar codes to
the machine learning based clonability attacks.
4. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we investigated the clonability of printable
graphical codes using DataMatrix modulation typical for
many PGC designs using machine learning based attacks.
We tested the proposed framework with two different DNN
architectures on real printed data. We empirically proved
the possibility to accurately estimate the printable codes for
high quality printers even from the relatively small training
datasets. Based on the performed experiments and obtained
results we can identify three main criteria for successful fake
detection: (a) the printing quality, (b) the amount of errors
in estimated codes and (c) the regularity of the estimated
errors. The defenders should prefer average quality print-
ers with a dot-gain sufficient to make regular errors in the
originals estimation. Moreover, the results show that modern
machine learning technologies make the printable graphical
codes vulnerable to clonability attacks.
For future work, we aim at examining other types of
graphical codes, at investigating the possibilities of mobile
phones for the detection of fake codes and to compare the
abilities of machine learning approaches versus hand-crafted
attacks. Finally, we plan to consider GAN-like architectures
to produce even more accurate fakes. The impact of the num-
ber of training examples and training from the original digital
templates are also amongst our future priorities.
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